Operation Cerberus
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Operation Cerberus (German: Zerberus) was the name given to the escape during World War II of the Kriegsmarine's ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and a number of smaller ships from Brest to ports in Germany and Denmark via the English Channel.
Hitler, convinced of an impending Allied invasion of Norway, ordered the escape. On 11 February, 1942, the ships left port at night and escaped detection for more than twelve hours. Despite British air attacks, which cost the Royal Air Force ten planes, by 13 February all the ships had completed their transit. The action has entered history as the "Channel Dash".
The operation was named after Cerberus, the three-headed dog in Greek mythology who guards the gate to Hades.
Vice-Admiral and Kriegsmarine Fleet Commander Otto Ciliax planned and led the successful German operation. His chief opponent was Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay of the Royal Navy who was allocated six destroyers equipped with torpedoes, which should have been at four hours' notice in the Thames Estuary but were not. There were also three Hunter class escorts but they had no torpedoes so posed little threat to the German capital ships. The 32 motor torpedo boats under his command were counterbalanced by the German flotilla of E-boats. For various reasons the Fleet Air Arm, RAF Coastal Command and RAF Bomber Command all failed in a timely fashion to provide the level of support they had promised. This was in part because all services expected the Germans to attempt the dash through the Channel at night time and were wrong footed by the Germans' audacious move. Fleet Air Arm reconnaissance failed to spot the ships leaving Brest because their radars failed. Two Spitfires of RAF Fighter Command spotted the ships in the channel but as they were under strict orders not to break radio silence (and they had not been briefed to look for the German flotilla), they waited until they landed to inform their superiors of what had been seen.
Because Fighter Command was not expected to be the first to spot the German flotilla in the Channel, valuable time was lost reporting the sighting up the chain of command and on to the Royal Navy and Bomber Command. Uncoordinated attacks by the motor boats and the Fleet Air Arm Swordfish torpedo biplanes failed to harm their targets. Although they failed to hit their targets, the bravery of the Swordfish crews was commented on by friend and foe alike. RAF Bomber Command's response was tardy, only 39 of the 242 bombers which took part found and attacked the ships and no hits were scored.
The six old destroyers and four more recently-built escort Hunts were taken by surprise. Instead of being on station, they were practising their gunnery in the North Sea. They steamed south to intercept the flotilla but arrived only in time to deliver one salvo of torpedoes, all of which missed. Counter fire severely damaged the destroyer HMS Worcester.
The British had failed to stop the flotilla before it reached the safety of German home waters and had suffered severe damage to a destroyer and the loss of 42 aeroplanes. The Germans did not escape damage free though, both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hit mines and were damaged.
See also
External link
- Operation "Cerberus" (11 - 13 February 1942) (http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharncerberus.html)ja:ツェルベルス作戦