Talk:Free will

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Free will is a featured article, which means it has been identified as one of the best articles produced by the Wikipedia community. If you see a way this page can be updated or improved without compromising previous work, feel free to contribute.

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It would be interesting to see a definition of "will", as in "free will." In English, it is conveniently the opposite of "won't" as a verb. So "will" is what you will do rather than what you won't do. Seems like as good a definition as any, but the philosophers can surely muck it up. Fairandbalanced 03:12, 28 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Regarding moral responsibilty, should the utilitarian notion be mentioned here that criminals should be punished not because they "deserve" it but because doing so would yield greater utility than not doing so? (I know far too little to make such an addition myself)

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It's not clear what side of dualism the article is on. Or rather from a NPOV angle, doesn't make it clear that dualism is involved as well. If it rejects (Descartes') dualism, then isn't even the "want" of a person, a state of the brain and subject to the same rules of physical determinism. Gyan

Excellent job. Thank you.

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An encyclopedic article should not be biased towards any particular side. However, a discussion of modern dualism would be welcome IMHO, as would an addition on utilitarianism. Whoever helped write the entry on free will is to be congratulated, it is very well written and clear, reasonably thorough and yet concise---unusual for this topic when one browses the literature!

So I don't want to rock the boat, nevertheless I had some heretical thoughts: the thing is, isn't it a valid position to supppose that a form of mysticism might surround free will and morality? Understand I'm a scientist so I abhor mystic approaches to purely rational topics, but when it comes to free will is it not an open question whether or not the phenomenon is materialistic and rational or not? I mean who can say for sure? Taking either a rational or a mystic stance is a prejudice IMHO, the only honest approach is to be completely open and honest. The free will debate is captured too much by ideologues of one stripe or the other. That would be my only advice at the moment for anyone who wants to extend or edit the article.

What would this third stance be? Post a draft here. Gyan

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Under "Other Issues": Probably it should be mentioned that the existence of a universally omnipotent entity does not logically imply that free will is illusory. An omnipotent being could logically choose to relinquish control to free agents, without relinquishing either omnipotence or omniscience. The key to resolving this seeming paradox being that free will might be granted provisionally to whatever agents have free will (but that's another topic I won't address), or in other words it is not an absolute gift. Now, does anyone know of simple (or not so simple?) models for this sort of scenario, i.e. is this a consistent set of propositions? I have been unable to say so one way or the other. I think it is the key to resolving the old conundrum of free will and omnipotence. Religionists needen't deny free will and libertarians needn't deny God! If there are any published papers dealing logically with this issue they should be cited. It's hard to believe no one has logically resolved this issue before in clear terms. That's just my 2 cents worth. Blair

It's my understanding that omnipotence is only part of the problem, that omniscience also presents challenges to the concept of free will. If an entity can see exactly what you're going to do five minutes into the future, it doesn't necessarily have to have the power to do anything about it to still call into question whether your will is "free." Bryan 18:15, 21 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Omniscience is not a problem worth writing too much about though, because a fairly simple reply would be that knowledge about some agent's future does not imply that that agent had no freedom to define that future (at least in part). The omniscient entity need not be the cause of the events that it knows about or can foresee. Blair 08 March 2004

That's missing the point. The omniscient being need not be the cause, but if it can accurately predict what you're going to do 100 hours into the future, how is your will "free"? How could you have done otherwise? If you could, the being wouldn't be omniscient. So by definition, if an omniscient being exists, there's no free will. -Gyan 01:12, 10 Mar 2004 (UTC)

I don't see this. If the being can foresee what you are going to do he may not be able to change anything. In fact, he can't, as he can only see what you are going to do which supposes that he can't subsequently change his mind and make you do something else. Suppose you have a TV set in your room which can show you every future event. You cannot, however, leave the room nor communicate with anyone so as to change the future you see on the screen.

Surely this doesn't influence the "free will" of everyone else.

Now if you have a TV screen which shows the future - and you are omnipotent and can change the future (so the screen actually shows WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF YOU AS AN OMNIPOTENT BEING DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE FUTURE) - that's different!

Exile 16:51, 27 Jan 2005 (UTC)

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I agree with Gyan re: the above, for what it's worth. As for the earlier question, William James (I think) offered an interesting analogy that he felt offered a solution to the free will-omniscience debate. If you imagine God as a master chess player, and any human as his amateur "opponent," you could imagine him knowing he was going to win the game without knowing every specific move the amateur would make. In that respect, the individual choices would be free, which would technically constitute a qualification to omniscience, but the outcome would be inevitable. It is an interesting analogy, but I think it still doesn't explain away the problem of someone knowing what will happen to you when you are 80, and you still considering yourself free. Patrick Grey Anderson 19:04, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Contents

1 Vandalism? 2 Science of free will 3 Theology 4 Quantum mechanics deterministic? 5 Predeterminism & Omniscience 6 Disputed para cut to talk. 7 Compatibilism 8 moral responcibility. 9 "Unfree action?" "Up to something else" 10 Last sentense of intro...colon needed? 11 Removed POV section 12 3rd to last paragraph very POV 13 Go 14 In theology 15 Free will/scientific determinism 16 Request for references

Vandalism?

Why did you revert that, and even more so, why call it vandalism? Seemed like an acceptable ex. link to me. Sam [Spade (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=User_talk:Sam_Spade&action=edit&section=new)] 00:55, 21 May 2004 (UTC)

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I agree with the removal of the external link. It was also added to the determinism page, and seems to be someone's pet project that is being advertised through Wikipedia. Of course, external links are allowed, but then by that broad criterion people can start putting links to their blogs at the bottom of the United States of America entry because they write about stuff that happens in the U.S. So, I will remove it again. Patrick Grey Anderson 18:48, 21 May 2004 (UTC)

Science of free will

(William M. Connolley 11:24, 15 Jul 2004 (UTC)) The page says that most interp of QM are that the universe is indeterministic. This isn't true: QM is only stochastic *when measured* otherwise it is perfectly deterministic. The universe can't be measured from outside.

The Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy states, Quantum theory is indeed very well confirmed. However, there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it, on what it shows us with respect to how things are in the world. Indeterministic as well as deterministic interpretations have been developed, but it is far from clear whether any of the existing interpretations is correct. See below for further discussion...

The sentence "the brain activity leading up to the subject flicking their wrist began approximately one-third of a second before the subject consciously decided to move" could use clarification, and/or a reference to the actual experiment. How did the experimenter measure the exact time when "the subject consciously decided to move"? The subject couldn't very well indicate that moment by some action, say, flicking the wrist!

Theology

One possible response to the problems of an omniscient God and free will is "open theism." This position holds that God does not know the future because, quite simply, the future does not exist. That contrary to science fiction, the future is not "out there," waiting for us to live through it. And so, with this position one can espouse a God who knows everything there is to know, including all the millions of possibilities/alternatives that the future holds, but he does not know the future because the future, not existing, is not knowable.

In the case of a divine prophecy, it is not that God knows all the future, but that he knows that he will bring this or that to pass, and so, as the all-powerful God, that much is indeed certain and determined.

A further problem with Calvinism is that the Bible is clear that "God is not willing that any should perish." Of course, Calvinism's "double predestination" (i.e., some predestined to heaven, others to hell) falls prey to this scripture, along with scriptures that indicate that one can have their name removed from the Book of Life.

A wholistic view of scripture seems to indicate that some events are predetermined...and some are not. This permits God to predestine some to salvation, without predestining anyone to hell. That is, some are free to choose, and while their choice may take them to hell, it would not be because God preferred it in the sense of forcing it to happen.

I removed this because it seems to be rather biased, uses too many religious terms without explanation or reference, and is a very incomplete argument in any case--probably outside the scope of this article. Perhaps it could be moved, along with a more thorough discussion, to a separate article.

I don't know who you are, but receive a grateful ("amateur") theologian's thanks. It is incredibly biassed against one particular view of theology. It also bears mentioning that this is dangerously close to falling foul of the no original research policy, as it's an extremely limited minority which holds this position. Seems like someone was out to cause trouble. Wooster 16:54, 6 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Quantum mechanics deterministic?

1. A quick look at the chart on the interpretation of quantum mechanics page shows that, of the 6 interpretations mentioned, only two are deterministic (which would point to "some", not "many", "most", or "all"), and of the two that are deterministic, one, the many worlds theory, is only arguably deterministic in any meaningful sense, so that leaves one unarguably deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
2. The one unarguably deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics relies on unknown or unknowable (depending on who you ask) variables, meaning there is no particular reason, aside from a penchant for determinism, to choose the Bohm interpretation over others.
3. There are certainly other interpretations of quantum mechanics that don't appear on the page mentioned above, such as superstring theory (yes, superstring theory is more than an interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it includes such an interpretation), which is deterministic, but still the overriding majority of interpretations present the quantum world as either fundamentally random or subject to laws of cause and effect that don't meaningfully resolve into what we would call determinism.

-Seth Mahoney 00:17, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 09:48, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) You have misunderstood me. The std interp of QM is indeed stochastic *but only when a system is measured from outside*. When the system is evolving internally, it does so deterministically. Since the universe has no outside and thus can't be measured, the QM interp for the whole universe would appear to be deterministic.

Throw out some references, please. -Seth Mahoney 17:09, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:14, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) To what? That the copenhagen interp only introduces chance upon measurement? I can if you like, but its "well known".

Yes. -Seth Mahoney 17:18, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:27, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Read point (3) of Copenhagen interpretation - (the answer 3, not the qn 3). Admittedly that only says that measurement causes indet, it doesn't say that that is the only time indet occurs. Do you really require the second half? QM consists of precisely 2 bits: the equations, and the measurements. The equations are deterministic: they are d(system)/dt = f(system).

Actually, I read it to say that only when there is an act of measurement does the particle in question behave even remotely deterministically - before the collapse of the wave function, after which, if I'm remembering correctly, it behaves either as a particle or a wave (ie, its behavior can be predicted), it behaves as neither, and therefore can only be predicted statistically, that is, its behavior is not strictly deterministic. So I'm seeing CI as saying that the universe is basically behaving chaotically when we're not looking and deterministically when we are. This would be consistent with some work done by John Wheeler (his last project, he says) regarding the relationship between the observer and the observed universe and with some criticisms of CI (Schroedinger's cat, Einstein's criticisms, etc.). -Seth Mahoney 17:46, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:41, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) No, this is all completely and totally incorrect. Measurement introduces chance: the wavefunction collapses (assuming we're in CI). After this, the system evolves deterministically.

So measurement introduces chance, by collapsing the wavefunction

(William M. Connolley 20:20, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Yes

and forcing the thing in question to behave as a particle or as a wave.

WMC: no not really. The indeterminacy is rather more and less than this. Forget the wave/particle stuff: thats *not* where the endet comes in. The indet is (see next comment)

What is the state before the measurement? That is, what is the thing in question doing before the measurement takes place?

WMC: before the measurement the system is in a state sys = sum ( a_i * state_i ) where the sum is over the possible eigenstates (and may be an integral not a sum, but for simplicity...) and a_i are coefficients representing the chance of it being in eigenstate state_i. Measurement forces the system into one of the states state_i, with probability proportional to a_i.

From the fabulous Dr. Fynemann, if you can't describe it in terms that anyone can understand, you don't really understand it yourself, which I don't say to be insulting but to point out that 99.99999% of the people who happen to browse this talk page have no idea what you're talking about. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

Also, still waiting on those sources. -Seth Mahoney 18:37, Aug 5, 2004 (UTC)

WMC: Why not just read the Quantum mechanics article: it says it there.

Because the Quantum mechanics article makes contradictory statements about quantum mechanics and determinism. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

But it is perfectly clear about the 2 processes: evolution (deterministic) and measurement (not). See the bottom for this.

If it's a matter of whether some or most interpretations of QM are deterministic, is it a matter of what proportion of the interpretations are deterministic or is it a matter of how the consensus interprets QM? Either way, "some" is probably the safest bet. As to whether CI is deterministic, it seems pretty clear that in some circumstances CI says that multiple outcomes are physically possible and only one obtains; that is, the outcome (future) is not fully determined by the prior conditions. True for a single particle or a universe full of them? No? --Rikurzhen 23:36, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:41, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) This is the same misinterpretation that SM made.

I think maybe your missing the definition of indeterminism: that some events are not fully determined by their causes. The definiton of determinism by contrast is that all events have sufficient causes. So in CI the collapse of a wavefunction is a indeterminsitic event that makes the universe "indeterministic". In a libertarian agent-causation theory of free will, it is the uncaused will of agents in an otherwise determinsitic universe that makes such a world indeterminsitic. --Rikurzhen 11:30, Aug 5, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 20:20, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) You have missed the point. The point is, that for a closed system (the universe) there is nothing external to the system to make the measurement and hence nothing to cause the collapse.

That's a perfectly fine point to make (though some might argue that God would be an observer external to the universe). The problem that we're getting at here is that CI can't be said to be deterministic in a meaningful sense - it doesn't make absolute predictions about the future state of the universe. From the article:

Quantum mechanics provides probabilistic results because the physical universe is itself probabilistic rather than deterministic.

Which, as I understand it, is because any description prior to measurement in quantum mechanics is in terms of probability, not an absolute position, velocity, etc. This description evolves deterministically over time but does not describe a (again, meaningfully) deterministic universe because the initial description is not absolute, but in terms of probability - that is, either our ignorance or the nature of the very small things in the universe prevents us from describing things in terms of the very simple laws of cause and effect that make up any discussion of determinism. In fact, if the universe does actually operate this way and not along the lines of a hidden variable theory, it can only be described as indeterministic. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 09:58, 7 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Drop the rather too deep indenting, but I'm replying to SM above: its true that CI is non-deterministic from a scientific POV of predicting the behavious of an observed system. But this is the *free will* article. If the entire universe if det from the POV of QM/CI, that is relevant to that debate, even if it doesn't have useful predictive consequences. ps: god as observer: Yes I've heard that one before.

Thanks for moving the indentation back a notch. First, I'm guessing you don't believe in God. That's fine - I'm not so keen on him either. However, you can't toss out God just because you don't believe in him. That is, without a solid proof of God's nonexistence as the ultimate observer, your argument actually doesn't imply that CI describes a deterministic universe. Since no such proof exists, any believer can just toss your argument out. As it goes, if you already believe in God, its a pretty good argument, though the implications of an all-observing being to CI would be interesting to explore.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) This is in the science section, to which god is orthogonal. Believers may insist that god is relevant to everything but thats no reason to accept it.

Believers have a valid claim, though, when someone says "there is nothing outside the universe to measure it and introduce chance", which is my entire point. No, a discussion of the existence of God doesn't belong in the science section, unless the science section makes a claim of that sort, in which case it is appropriate as a fairly common counter-argument. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Second, if CI is non-deterministic, then as it applies to free will, it would allow for the possibility of, at least, an indeterministic universe. If that allows for free will would be the next question.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) OK, here we have a useful distinction that hasn't popped up before. Even if the universe is indeterministic, that doesn't mean FW exists. Of course if the univ *is* det, then FW doesn't.

Agreed, but that wasn't your claim in the page. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) True: its a new and interesting point I hadn't thought of before.

Third, if the universe cannot be measured from the outside, it would seem that, as we are always inside the universe, that is, we're always a part of it, we can only measure from the inside, if that makes sense. That is, just marking something off and referring to it as a system which we are outside of doesn't actually make us, the observer, outside the system - there has to be some sort of meaningful and pre-existing boundary that places us definitionally outside.

One possible def of the universe is that it is everything, so by defn can't be measured from outside.

Right, that is one possible definition. However, since we're always inside, connected in a way to everything else, we can't measure from outside at all. We can't just pick out and label System X and say it is a candidate for measurement, because we're already involved in and a part of System X. If, then, System X can be said to be indeterministic only when measured from the outside, since we can never be outside, System X can never be said to be indeterministic. So, if that is indeed the claim of CI, it would seem that CI is not a viable explanation of QM. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) No, I don't agree with that. There can be different levels of "boxes". You can put an imaginary box round an electron (if you know where it is, ha!) and consider it a system, then you are outside that system and can observe (with CI, certainly). And so on to bigger systems. Once you are inside your box, though, you have to describe the system differently.

Fourth, determinism requires a strict cause and effect relationship between everything. If there is a single inteterminate element in this system, its effects will cause future events which are unpredictable, even in theory, and therefore not determined in any sense that is meaningful. By way of cliche example, picture a pool table with a few normal billiard balls and one special billiard ball that moves about randomly. The normal billiard balls bounce off one another exactly as we would expect, and bounce off the special billiard ball as well. Because its movements are totally random, though, when it impacts one of the normal billiard balls it introduces an unforeseeable motion into the ball, resulting in a system that is, overall, not deterministic. -Seth Mahoney 00:41, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Yeees, but what is the single non-det element?

From your earlier statement: Measurement introduces chance. If anything introduces chance, the overall system can't evolve deterministically. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Not relevant if the system is the whole universe.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Me, dropping indent again. Lets go back to what this was about, which is whatever sci might have to say about free will. My contention is that all sci theories (of the total universe) are det. Hence no support for free will. But this is not a strong support for no-free-will for 2 reasons: 1) these are all provisional theories and clearly none of them are of the total system 2) the only known way to write evolution-of-the-system eq's are det (the one exception being QM/CI measurement, but thats not "evolution"). I wouldn't want the article to say sci-says-there-is-no-free-will. But neither should the article use QM to try to support FW.

Dropping down another level, when you think about things in terms of sci (that is, of the material observable universe) there is no object that corresponds to FW. You can make chemical/elec signals in the brain some sort of object/system corresponding to "thought" but described in that way there is nothing of FW in them.

I agree that the article shouldn't use QM to try to support free will (unless it is going to include a discussion of Roger Penrose's much-disliked theories), but I don't think that saying "some interpretations of QM are deterministic" does that - for most people who have read a book or two or seen a PBS special or two on QM, that any interpretation of QM is deterministic is enough of a shock to prod them to think twice about its use as free will supporter.

OK. I'm happy with the current text, BTW.

I agree that on a scientific level there is no object that supports free will. I think that that is inherent in the nature of the process of science itself, though, not necessarily inherent in the universe. That is, according to the standard model: experiment, theorize, experiment, no unique event (which every act of free will would be) can ever be studied, because no experiment can be devised in which a unique event could be replicated. Science, generally, also studies caused events, which suggests that we could not scientifically study non-caused events (if they existed), which again, every act of free will would have to be (if it were caused, it would have to be unfree).

But yeah, I agree that ultimately scientific study excludes the possibility of free will. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Dropping indent again. You wanted a clear ref to QM-is-evolution-then-measurement. If you can find it, Penrose's new book has exactly that, very clearly diagrammed: its p529 fig 22.1, in the discussion of U/R operators. Note that Penrose says (very likely correctly, IMHO) that the current theory (he is describing QM/CI) may well be oversimplifying, but he does make it clear that this *is* the current theory.

That's cool. You don't have the title handy, do you? -Seth Mahoney 18:47, Aug 10, 2004 (UTC)

ParagonX 17:02, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): WMC said - "My contention is that all sci theories (of the total universe) are det. Hence no support for free will." Determinism does not preclude free will.

(William M. Connolley 16:00, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Oh yes it does.

ParagonX 17:38, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): Not at all. Determinism does not necessitate predetermination, considering emergent system properties like consciousness and will. Determinism means that everything obeys causality, but this doesn't necessitate predetermination. You state otherwise, but give no reasons why.

WMC also said - "You can make chemical/elec signals in the brain some sort of object/system corresponding to "thought" but described in that way there is nothing of FW in them." You're looking it it wrong. Free will is not inherent in any object, it is an emergent property of a system (the brain).

(William M. Connolley 16:00, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) So what?

ParagonX 17:38, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): So you're drawing an unsupported conclusion because of it. If you have something to support it, by all means, spit it out. Consider cellular automata (eg. the game of life by John Conway). It is based on essentially two simple rules. There are no rules governing the existence of objects or replication, etc. Yet objects, reproduction, and even simple "societies" form. These are emergent properties of the system, and are not determined by the rules of the system.

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Of course they are determined by the rules. What you mean is, something like: they would be hard to predict a priori from the rules; or that it wuld be hard to design rules to generate such properties. But that doesn't affect that obvious: those properties are totally determined by the rules, the domain size/shape/topology and the initial state.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): It's an analogy. Yes, the game of life is deterministic, but reality on the other hand has consciousness, and consciousness allows for free will (the act of choosing between possible choices one is conscious of). On the other hand, it's not quite determined solely by the rules, because it also depends on the initial configuration, and on whether anything is altered during the course of following those rules (like adding or removing dots from a generation). There are no rules for size/shape/topology etc. in the game, they are emergent properties. It's goverened by 2 simple rules: 1 - If a cell has three neighbours, a new dot is born, and 2 - if a dot has fewer than 3 or more than 4 neighbours it dies. Nothing is said about objects, etc.

Same in real life. The laws of nature do not govern the existence of such emergent properties as consciousness,

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Now you are assuming your conclusions. I think it entirely likely that the laws of nature *do* determine the existence of whatever it is that we have labelled conciousness.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): I didn't deny that. I'm saying there are no laws/rules regarding consciousness. It's a result of emergence. Emergent properties may be predetermined according to the rules and initial state, but only if one of those emergent properties doesn't happen to be something like consciousness.

or even matter (it is an emergent property of quantum physics), yet they exist. Consciousness and will allows us to interact with the world in a non-deterministic manner.

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) You're just making this up.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Seems you're the one making things up. You have repeatedly stated your beliefs contradict everything I write, and you have repeatedly failed to back up a single claim, despite my repeated queries. You have failed to support any of your arguments, and even if you were correct in claiming determinism necessitates predetermination, it does not matter with regard to the disputed point, since the argument should be included in the article to give it a more balanced view providing different perspectives. NPOV is preferred, so don't insert your bias. If you disagree with it, good for you, but you should not make a strawman argument simply because you disagree with it. If you truely believe there are good contrary arguments, then by all means add them to the page, but don't debate a strawman, it's really bad form. As far as I'm concerned, if you don't provide a shred of evidence/reasoning supporting your arguments in your next post here, then the matter is resolved, and the argument should stay.

I've not read everything above, but one point that keeps cropping up is that of the system evolving determninistically if not disturbed or observed by an external observer. This need not be God, but can be at the level of individual consciousness - Wigner and maybe even Von Neumann considered the possibility that conscious observers could be collapsing bits of the universe, as in the scientist opening Schoedinger's box and collapsing the cat into a dead or alive state - before he was presumambly a superpositon. And indeed this is not being made up - one of the modern exponents of this aspect of QM is Henry Stapp who describes rather eleoquently the difference between the deterministic phase of wave function evolution under Scroedinger's equation and the non-deterministic wave function collapse. This collpase at atomic level Stapp sees as a sort of prototype for conscious choice - he suggests a macroscopic superposition of brain states, each corresponding to a different choice of e.g. dinner - your choice occurs when you 'choose' to collapse onto one of the possible choices. Finally, on 'hidden variable' theory, the great white hope of the quntum dterminist minority - Alain Aspect's experiment in the early 80's showed that any such hidden variable theory must be non-local - i.e. 'ghostly action at a distance' - thus there is no local (non-ghostly) hidden variable theory. So whichever way you twist you have 'weirdness' - free will and indeterminism and/or non-locality or the interconnectedness of all things in the universe. --hughey 14:14, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Predeterminism & Omniscience

While determinism isn't necessarily at odds with free will, predetermination is. Since omniscience necessitates predetermination, omniscience and free will are necessarily mutually exclusive. --ParagonX 03:53, 18 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I disagree with the above statement, and with the following quote from text: "In Christian theology, God is described as not only omniscient but omnipotent, which implies that not only has God always known what choices you will make tomorrow, but actually chose what you would choose. That is, by virtue of His foreknowledge He knows what will influence your choices, and by virtue of His omnipotence He controls those factors."

Two points of discussion:

• Can you support your statement that omniscience necessitates pre-destination? Doesn't such an implication rely on an omniscience that remains limited with regards to a fixed perception in time? That is to say, if the possessor of ominscience exists outside of , or is not bound by, what is typically considered the linear progression of time - a state not incompatible with an omnipresent being - doesn't that remove the implication?
• Can the statement that omnipotence implies agency as represented in the quote above be supported? Simply because a being possesses the power or facility to cause any or every event, does it necessarily follow that they must do/have done so?

Many thanks. --Alavery7 17:05:, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

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William M. Connolley, you state the paradox referred to by some compatibilists is poorly thought out. I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on it. -ParagonX 03:37, 20 Oct 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:51, 20 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Its the bits you keep removing...

• predestination does not imply predictability (why should it? Quite apart from the logical separation from the two, if you could "predict" the fate of the entire universe you would need the state of the entire universe in your head. There isn't room)
• even predictability does not imply the ability to change the future (again, its a complete disconnect between the two concepts).

hence the paradox is a very poor one. Are there really "professional" philosophers capable of advancing an argument this poor?

ParagonX 08:07, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Predestination doesn't logically imply predictability, it simply implies it is a possibility.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) So there is no paradox

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): That does not follow. It does not matter whether you agree with the argument or not. It is a compatibilist standpoint, and as such ought to be included. And it should be stated properly, not as you would have it.

There is nothing that implies one would need the entire state of the universe in one's head in order to predict something which was predetermined. One need only consider relevant factors.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Vague/meaningless.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Premature dismissal. There is nothing to support your claim.

Many events are predetermined and most of them are predictable to some extent (eg. everyone will die, the question is when).

Splendid. So, given that you can predict that you will be dead in 1000 years, does that give you the ability to change it? No.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): If it could be changed it wouldn't be predetermined. If, on the other hand, I knew I was supposed to die on a certain date, I could change that. One obvious way would be to commit suicide before-hand. Not a desirable outcome, but it makes the point. Foreknowledge is mutually exclusive with predetermination.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) This is stupid. The argument you inserted into the article asserts that there is a paradox, because predictability implies an ability to change. However, you've just provided an example to falsify this: your death within 1000 years is predictable, but unchangable.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): Essentially yes. The implication depends on the existence of free will, but that is the argument. Your example is flawed, because being dead in 1000 years is not an event. Dying in 1000 years would be. There are predetermined things, and as such they can't be changed. I was asserting that non-predetermined events could be changed if they were predictable. The prediction would necessitate awareness of it, and then one can make conscious choices regarding it. It's not predetermined when I'll die, and foreknowledge of my death would give me the ability to alter it. I'm surprised you have difficulty reasoning through this yourself.

A predetermined event is simply where all possible future timelines intersect. One can disregard many things and still be able to predict predestined events. Predictability implies the ability to change the future because if one knows what will happen then a choice could be made which would alter the course of events.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Simply repeating this won't make it true.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Of course not, it stands on it's own merits, which you have apparently blinded yourself to.

Even incompatibilist determinists don't argue that we don't have the ability to choose. Consciousness gives us that ability. Knowledge of the future would give the ability to potentially alter the course of events in such a way as to prevent it from happening.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Simply repeating this won't make it true.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): See above. Do you have any real arguments? Any at all?

Thus foreknowledge of the future precludes predetermination. You may argue that determinism does not equal predictability, but compatibilists can argue otherwise, and that is the point.

Compatibilist can argue whatever illogic they like. And you can even write it into the page, as long as no one objects anough to remove it. But ath doesn't mean that the obvious countere arguments shouldn't be presented, which is what I am doing.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): No, that's not what you are doing at all. You are censoring an argument you disagree with. I am stating the claims, and you are altering those claims, but that's not what such a compatibilist would argue. If you want to add counter arguments, do it in a different section of the page, not by altering the argument you want to refute.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) I'm censoring nothing. Its you thats removing text. I'm noting the obvious fallacies in the argument you're trying to insert. Determinism doesn't imply predicatability (its the other way round: predictability implies determinism). And predicatability doesn't imply the ability to change.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): You are censoring the argument by changing it. Censorship != deleting text, censorship is blocking ideas, which is what you're doing with your additions to the text. You were not noting any fallacies. Or at least if you were, you weren't adding them to the page. Predetermination necessitates determinism. Determinism implies predetermination.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) And finally: having been obliged to read the text you've inserted several times, it seems more like nonsense than ever. Please provide a source for it.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): If you have a problem with it, add your own arguments to the page. Debates all over the Internet regarding free will vs. the purported omniscience of God bring about this paradox.

(William M. Connolley 18:40, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Please provide a (reputable) source: not merely an assertion that such sources exist.

Disputed para cut to talk.

(William M. Connolley 19:26, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) OK, Paragon and I keep reverting each other over this para, so I have cut it to the talk page to attempt to find agreement. P wants:

Some compatibilists point to a paradox that they assert is created when one assumes predetermination as a result of determinism. If the future is predetermined, they claim it would be ultimately predictable. If it were predictable, then knowledge of the future is possible, and it could be changed. This last contradicts predetermination, which was assumed to be true, thus they claim predetermination creates a paradox.

He has provided no sources for this. I think the "paradox" above is nonsense, and proposed:

Some compatibilists point to a paradox that they assert is created when one assumes predetermination as a result of determinism. If the future is predetermined, it might be thought to be ultimately predictable, although it is not clear why this predicatability should occur. If it was predictable, then knowledge of the future is possible. If knowledge of the future is possible, then it might be possible that it can be changed, although this it is unclear whether this follows. This last contradicts predetermination, which was assumed to be true, thus predetermination creates a paradox, but only if the other two assumptions are also true.

However, sicne I'm fairly sure the P para is junk, I'll now start arguing for it to be deleted entirely.

I'm not certain, but I think that this paradox assumes presentism. --Rikurzhen 04:55, Oct 24, 2004 (UTC)

ParagonX 04:41, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC): It does not appear to be dependant on presentism. It seems a strange viewpoint. Regarding time in that manner, I'd say existence is relative. The past and future exist in relative states, and are different for everyone, since each person has their own timeline (or worldline in physics). Regardless, even if it were dependant on such a stance, that does not necessarily invalidate the argument, nor provide sufficient reason to remove the entry.

True. I haven't heard this argument before, and it seems odd to me, but if it is discussed by free will thinkers, then it should be in the article. --Rikurzhen 06:13, Oct 25, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:03, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Well, although I'm obliged (much against my will) to accept that people do take compatibilism seriously, P has still not provided any evidence that compatibilists do indeed present this "paradox".

ParagonX 20:38, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC): Why do you still persist? Here, look for yourself (http://www.google.com/search?num=30&hl=en&q=newcomb%27s+paradox&btnG=Search).

(William M. Connolley 21:05, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)) If you meant to refer to Newcomb's paradox, why didn't you say so before? Perhaps because it doesn't fit.

ParagonX 13:14, 26 Oct 2004 (UTC): Because I couldn't remember the name.

Newcomb's paradox is important to the free will debate. It should be mentioned by name/link. --Rikurzhen 01:50, Oct 26, 2004 (UTC)

Compatibilism

(William M. Connolley 22:13, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) To me, the compatibilist position appears to be twaddle. Does it actually belong in the article, in the sense of: is it a major part of the thinking on free will? Google throws up about 3,400 hits for compatibilism (but one of the highest is [1] (http://www.theagon.org/blog/index.php?p=74)) as opposed to 100* that for determinism and 1.4M for free will. I'm beginning to wonder is this is just a minority POV hijacking the article.

ParagonX 01:35, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Doesn't matter. Popularity is not a measure of truth, and claiming something should be removed because you think it's "twaddle" amounts to explicitly stating you want to add an unfounded bias into the page. I say unfounded because you have repeatedly refused to support any of your claims with actual arguments.

To my knowledge, compatibilism is a major philosophical program. [2] (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/) --Rikurzhen 22:20, Oct 23, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 22:28, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Hmmm... I have to admit that link appears to demonstrate that it is taken seriously. OTOH it also confirms me in my view that that compatibilism is nonsense (how those philosophers can talk!). While I'm here, I note that the link asserts Hobbes as a classic compatibilist: he isn't: half of compatibilism is missing: the determinism bit.

ParagonX 01:35, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Compatibilism is taken seriously, and I find your insistent premature dismissals of it to be quite ignorant and imprudent. According to [Skepdic.com (http://skepdic.com/freewill.html)]: "The modern view of determinism and free will does not see the two concepts as mutually exclusive. This view began to take shape with arguments such as those offered by Thomas Hobbes."

Here's another link for you: [[3] (http://www.benbest.com/philo/freewill.html#pseudo)]

---

(DrRetard):

William M. Connelley, compatibilism is the MOST WIDELY-HELD position on the free will dispute among contemporary philosophers. You may not like this fact, but it is a fact. When you go on to change the article from "Some" to "Most" philosophers accepting incompatibilism, you are doing nothing more respectable than trolling, or simply acting the fool.

Moreover, Hobbes most certainly IS a compatibilist soft determinist (FYI: compatibilists needn't accept determinism). Just read the beginning of Leviathan, Chater 21. Or, for that matter, read the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry (written by real philosophy professors with real PhDs who are real experts in their respective field):

"For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding, “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an EXEMPLARY EXPRESSION of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to her will." (Emphasis added)

ParagonX, you made a change to the article, whereby it characterizes compatibilists thus: "They accept determinism, and hold that the causal agent in a free choice is not necessarily predetermined." That is a TERRIBLE mischaracterization. First of all, compatibilists aren't required to accept determinism. They need only accept that determinism is compatible with free will. Of course, most compatibilists are indeed "soft determinists", who accept determinism and free will. Second, according to soft determinists, EVERY EVENT -- including free actions and the psychological events of the agents that produce free actions -- is subject to causal determinism. To say that the causal agent in a free choice is undetermined to accept some sort of Reid/Chisholm-style libertarianism -- QUITE THE OPPOSITE of soft determinism.

You two need to stop messing around with this article until you acquire some rudimentary knowledge of the subject matter.

moral responcibility.

there is nothing here about whether the issue of moral responcibility has any real place in law. Which is something that has been debated to great leangth.

It is often argued that the law doesn't simply punish people because they did something moraly wrong, and therefore determinism/free will is irrelevent.

For example, sentences are usually given with other things in mind: the article on punishment lists Deterrence, Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, Restoration and Retributive justice as reasons for punishment. And, arguably, none of these are influenced by the determinism debate. Just because a person had no responcibility for their actions, doesn't mean that we shouldn't attempt to prevent them from commiting a predictable crime in future, or that we shouldn't give apt retribution for those that were wronged.

(edit)I didn't add anything myself because this is on the featured articles list, and i didn't want to mess anything up :)

--220.240.173.96 03:51, 19 Dec 2004 (UTC)

"Unfree action?" "Up to something else"

I will admit to being somewhat an unsophisticated dilettante when it comes to philosophy, but what the hell does "Conversely, an unfree action would be "up to" something else" mean? The version on the Main Page reads even worse: "Consequently, an unfree action must be somehow "up to" something else." Taco Deposit | Talk-o Deposit 15:00, Dec 21, 2004 (UTC)

I agree (although I would use a more gentle language), these phrases are both very colloquial and very vague. Perhaps using some type of construct with the word "control" might be more enlightening? 69.141.33.247 15:27, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Last sentense of intro...colon needed?

When I read "We can ask several logically independent questions about free will.", I expect a colon and then a listing of the questions we can ask. This is a logical expectation. The article is excellent but the introduction is vague and confusing. 69.141.33.247 15:31, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Also,is "voulntrism" a word? 69.141.33.247 15:35, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

The spelling may not be right, but the word was the one taught to me when I studdied this at University. Which is why I added it :) --Crowley 21:34, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)Crowley

Removed POV section

I just removed the recently added "Free will" section, which was POV and highly unencyclopedic:

Free will has existed for ages, that can extend back as far as the bible, to as current as the war which takes place today(War in Iraq) Free will is a choice but yet at the same time a privlege in which we must learn how to accomodate and control. By possessing such power as free will,allows us to both cause good and cause evil. Many great leaders have battled free will and many more to come shall battle. As for now it is up to us to continue on making good from our free will in which we have.

Wikipedia is not a soapbox. --David Iberri | Talk 21:14, Dec 21, 2004 (UTC)

3rd to last paragraph very POV

The sections that talks about God (referring to the God of Christianity) is ridiculously biased and could easily be offensive to Christians. How exactly does God's omnipotence imply that he chooses our actions? Just because he is "all-capable" doesn't mean that he's "the only one capable".

(William M. Connolley 10:33, 22 Dec 2004 (UTC)) I don't understand how more than one entity could be all capable, otherwise they could conflict. This is just getting bogged down in words.

--For clarification, I'm not saying more than one entity can be all-capable, I'm saying that one entity can be all-capable, but other entities (e.g. humans) can still be "capable".

Also, saying that most Christians find ways of avoiding predestination is by all means a point of view, and should be replaced by something more along the lines of "most Christians consider the word "predestined" as it's used in the Bible to mean God did know, but did not choose". Perhaps it would be best to get rid of "most Christians" and reword it all together, since it's doubtful that anyone has polled all Christians. By at least getting rid of the negative wording ("find ways of avoiding"), this article can be less biased and offensive.

(William M. Connolley 10:33, 22 Dec 2004 (UTC)) I do agree that the FW article is not a sensible place to attack or even debate the Christian world view.

Go

As a point of information, Go is algorithmic, since it is a game of perfect information (all is visible to the players). No bluffing is possible, and there is no chance involved. Chess programming has received a greater amount of effort. It is true that the complexity of Go is much greater, and it is a much more philosophical game. Nonetheless, deleting the edit about it was a good call. Hu 21:00, 2004 Dec 24 (UTC)

In theology

I made some minor changes to this section. Previously, it seemed to say that the canonical Christian belief in predestination was the definition given, whereas in reality, this differs from sect to sect (as the article goes on to admit). I also removed the John 3:16 quote since its relevance is disputable: e.g. Calvinists do not think their position is contrary to John 3:16 in the least when 'properly' understood. -- OracleofTroy

Free will/scientific determinism

I've been perusing this article and all the related ones yet I've not seen one cover a view on free will that I've read. I am not entirely sure but, I believe, I read it in Murray Gellmann's "The Quark and the Jaguar". I believe the argument goes a little like this:

Free will must exist because a prediction is either correct or incorrect. If you make a prediction about a persons actions, and they are informed, they can usually act in such a way to avoid the prediction. Thus making the prediction incorrect.

If free will didn't exist then such behaviour would not be possible.

Such behavior isn't possible. KVenzke

I'm not sure how this affects other views of free will/determinism. But I believe shows that scientific determinism is impossible. That's because in a deterministic system it's thoeretically possible for a computer to 'solve' it. This 'solution' could then be consulted and approriate action taken to ensure the prediction is incorrect. (I am aware of chaos theory and QM that could be used to argue that such a deterministic solution is impossible).

I don't think this shows that determinism is impossible, but that it would be impossible to possess correct, complete predictions of the future. Surely that isn't surprising. KVenzke

I'm sure that this must have an origin somewhere else so don't know what references could be used. I also don't know enough about philosophy to know how it affects those interpretations.

Reasonableman 16:06, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Request for references

Hi, I am working to encourage implementation of the goals of the Wikipedia:Verifiability policy. Part of that is to make sure articles cite their sources. This is particularly important for featured articles, since they are a prominent part of Wikipedia. The Fact and Reference Check Project has more information. Thank you, and please leave me a message (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=User_talk:Taxman&action=edit&section=new) when you have added a few references to the article. - Taxman 17:27, Apr 22, 2005 (UTC)